This paper constitutes a contribution to discussion on main reforms introduced by the new treaty. The argument is based on three main theses. Firstly, the Treaty of Lisbon does not change a hybrid character of the European Union. Secondly, intergovernmental practices will still dominate in the EU system. Thirdly, democratic deficit as a feature of the system will not be significantly reduced. Main part of analysis is prefaced by general characterisation of the EU governance system.
ent institutions play rather minor role: their competences result from the will of member states that delegate powers to the Community/Union level only if they are not able to control observance of international obligations themselves. Member states tend to delegate powers also in other situations: when future decisions are not sure, when benefits from implementation of agreements by other partners are high and when the costs of delegation are acceptable. Institutional solutions create a kind of a hybrid system 11 . The source of the power of European law is after all the ratification of treaties connected with parliamentary assenting act. The European Union is becoming then the association of states 12 .
The second feature of the system of governance in the EU, the democratic deficit, is an extremely discussed matter. A common definition of the democratic deficit in the EU refers to a limited influence of the addressees of decisions taken by EU governing bodies on the contents of those decisions. The reason for a deficit is a transfer of decision-making centre from state to the Community/Union level without creating a supplementary mechanism that could offer the citizens possibility of participation and control of EU institutions. The convergence of the EU and the state systems does not remove the deficit. Moreover, the democratic deficit is a two-level phenomenon. It appears at the level of the Community/Union and at the level of member states: in this sense there is a double democratic deficit in the EU 13 .
The first level of the democratic deficit is characterised by two further elements: institutional deficit and participation deficit. Institutional deficit is an outcome of division of powers among EU institutions that prefers organs appointed without direct influence of citizens (Council, Commission). Participation deficit reflects lack of active participation of population which results from the size of the system (27 states with ca. 500 million citizens) reducing the possibility of real political discourse. The democratic deficit at the second level is caused by a transfer of many functions of the state to the Community/Union. Member states are no longer allowed to regulate some areas which leaves those areas uncontrolled and undermines the very quality of democracy 14 .
The most important reasons for democratic deficit are globalization and intensification of transborder interactions (external reason) as well as a specific for the EU dynamics of those phenomena (internal reason) 15 . The expression of the democratic deficit can be found in two dimensions: political participation of adult citizens and the level of freedom of participation in competitive decision-making process. There are six practical arguments for the existence of the democratic deficit in the EU:
1) indirect political accountability of the Commission (a main administrative institution);
2) a weak political role of the European Parliament (the only institution with direct political background resulting from elections);
3) a lack of lively and Europeanised system of intermediary institutions (European political parties, associations and media); 4) a strict division of initiative and legislation resulting in institutional (instead of political) tensions;
5) a character of integration process (negative integration prevails positive integration);
6) a lack of European demos and a rudimentary level of European society 16 .
However, there are also arguments that negate the thesis of the democratic deficit in the EU. The size of the system, its institutional structure, multinationalism, lack of common his- The European Union is not a state but a sui generis political and legal structure. Some elements of state are surely absent in the EU system: possibility of general management of political process, own army or monopoly of using force 20 . There are two limitations of democracy in EU structure: the size and diversity of the system as well as its unfinished nature.
The first results in variety of solutions proposed and the second impedes the identification of the citizen with the Community/Union as a system in statu nascendi 21 . Democracy is not the only way of legitimisation: the others are for instance sovereignty or expansion of definition of state in order to incorporate the notion of welfare. There is also possibility to diversify sources of legitimacy in different areas of the Union's activity
22
.
The EU system is determined not only by its own structure but also by perceptions of legitimate organisational rules. Constitutional logic of the EU can be perceived not only as logic of political community based on democratic assent of citizens but also as logic of international enterprise or supranational technocracy. Legitimacy depends then respectively on quality of member states' governments or efficiency of the system 23 .
The system of governance in the European Union reflects current state of integration process in Europe. A sovereign nation-state is still the most important participant of this process while the Community/Union continues to be a tool of achieving individual goals of every state. The role of the citizen is a second-order issue. This way formal structure and informal behaviour create a non-typical hybrid system. The European Union is a quasi-polity, nascent polity, emergent polity or would-be polity 24 . The following part of the paper consists of comparative analysis of the Nice system and the Lisbon system with respect to sui generis character of the European Union in terms of integration and democratic perspective.
Hybridity of the EU system can be characterised by seven elements:
1) the legal construction perceived as the "third" system;
2) legal nature of decisions;
3) decision-making procedures; 4) institutional system; 5) the powers of the Community/Union; 6) the competences of supranational bodies; 7) the possibility of "self-conferral" 25 .
The first element, the perception of the Nice EU as the "third" legal system, has its roots in the lack of treaty provisions dealing with the very nature of European construction. The basis of the specific character of the legal system can be found in Art. briefly, it stems from the ECJ case law that Community law is a specific legal order independent from both international and national laws. What is more, national provisions cannot be applied unless they correspond with Community provisions (primacy principle).
There is no reform of this system in the Treaty of Lisbon. The provisions on the character of the legal system and primacy are still not to be found in the primary law. The fourth element, institutional system, reflects the relative powers of member states. trans-European networks; energy; area of freedom, security and justice; common safety concerns in public health matters (for the aspects defined in the treaty). What is more, "in the areas of research, technological development and space, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities, in particular to define and implement programmes; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs.
(…) In the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs". As 
